UN inspector calls for new approach to Iraq
The United Nations faced special problems when trying to dismantle Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs, UN Special Commission weapons inspection team member Rod Barton told a recent seminar at the ANU's Centre for Middle Eastern and Central Asian studies. As Sylvia Deutsch* reports, Mr Barton is convinced that the UN must change its approach if it is to avoid another eight years of sanctions.
The real problem for the United Nations in dismantling Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs was the lack of documentation to support Iraq's claims that it had destroyed much of this material, a UN weapons inspector said in Canberra recently. Rod Barton, an Australian inspector for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which oversees the elimination of Iraqi weapons banned after the Gulf War in 1991, was speaking at a seminar in The Australian National University's Centre for Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies. He stressed that the views expressed were his own. A biochemist and microbiologist by training, he has been to Iraq 30 times as an UNSCOM inspector since his first visit in June 1991. Involved also on chemical weapons inspections, he served as principal investigator of Iraq's biological weapons program from 1994­1996. The weapons inspection program operates under two UN Security Council resolutions. Resolution 687 of April 1991 obliged Iraq to disclose its complete weapons program, including research facilities, imports of materials, equipment, testing, storage and disposal. Resolution 715 of October 1991 dealt with monitoring of Iraq's industries and there had been considerable cooperation by Iraq in this area. About 150 chemical and 85 biological sites were being monitored. To illustrate the extent of the problem for UNSCOM, Mr Barton detailed the size of the chemical weapons program. He estimated its worth at two to four billion dollars in terms of equipment and materials. Weaponry included 120,000 122mm rockets, mostly filled with nerve gas, about 90,000 artillery shells with mustard gas and nerve agents and about 36,000 chemical bombs. The biological weapons program was about one-tenth the size. Iraq at first denied having a biological weapons program but by 1995 confirmed its existence after extensive investigation by UNSCOM. Estimated production was 19,000 litres of bacterial agents such as anthrax and smaller amounts of other toxins, as well as 2500 litres of fungal agents. Ready for delivery were 25 SCUD warheads and 150 bombs. It was very difficult to account for all materials and equipment. Some were used in the war against Iran, some were destroyed by coalition bombing, and some Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally after the Gulf War. "The biggest difficulty is what Iraq claims it did unilaterally," he said. "There is no definitive evidence of what was destroyed. There were no videos, no documents, and only some diary entries by personnel present, which indicated that something had been destroyed. "I defy you to identify what was burnt and blown up," he said, showing pictures of destroyed material which could have included conventional munitions. "It is very deficient and a major area of dispute." An example of the problem was Nerve Agent Vx, one of the most poisonous human-made substances known. In 1991 Iraq claimed it had made only laboratory-sized quantities, but Mr Barton has seen a laboratory where he estimated they could have made one tonne a day. Originally claiming the lab was an insecticide factory. Iraq gradually conceded higher figures and by February 1996 admitted to the production of four tonnes. Mr Barton's own estimate was that they had produced about 90 and could have made up to 400 tonnes. "We can't take at face value their claim that they destroyed the material until we have received stronger evidence," he said. "Unless the UN and Iraq adopt a different approach I can see another eight years of sanctions." He offered his own suggestion on how to reach the endgame. Monitoring under Resolution 715 needed to continue indefinitely for regional security, to ensure that Iraq did not rebuild any of its weapons capabilities. On Resolution 687 a "line in the sand" could be drawn if the UN established criteria and guidelines to judge when Iraq could be given a "clean bill of health". The UN should institute incentives, linked to a timetable for phased lifting of sanctions, to encourage substantial cooperation from Iraq. He rejected the suggestion that the behaviour of UNSCOM inspectors was a factor affecting Iraqi cooperation. He also warned that military action would complicate monitoring and the endgame. Mr Barton has also served with UN operations in Somalia; been a scientific adviser; policy adviser on chemical and biological weapons proliferation and technical assessor on developments in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Australian Department of Defence. A Research Fellow at the ANU's Peace Centre in 1993, he is currently an independent consultant on defence and international affairs and continues his work as an UNSCOM inspector as required by the UN. A capacity audience at the seminar comprised academic staff and students, defence personnel and diplomatic representatives including Israeli ambassador Shmuel Moyal, Jordanian second secretary Basem Khries, Egyptian third secretary Maged Modleh and Iraqi charge d'affaires Khalid Mohammed. *Sylvia Deutsch is a Research Development Officer in the Faculty of Arts.